ANDY CROWE ● BILL YATES ● NICK WALKER ● CHUCK CASTO

NICK WALKER:  Welcome to Manage This, the podcast by project managers for project managers.  Every other week we carve out some time to meet and talk about what matters to you in the field of project management.  We pick the brains of some of the top performers in the profession, hear their stories, explore their methods, and celebrate their successes.

I’m your host, Nick Walker, and with me are a couple of guys who are the top of the tops, Andy Crowe and Bill Yates.  And Andy, last time we had a thought-provoking discussion with someone who has been right in the middle of managing crisis situations; and we get to hear more from him today.

ANDY CROWE:  I would say he’s been more in the middle of it than anybody I know personally.  And so it was a wonderful discussion about the Fukushima disaster.

NICK WALKER:  Chuck Casto, President of the Casto Group, brings with him a long and prestigious career in nuclear safety and regulatory issues.  He was a member of the Senior Executive Service at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, holding the position of Regional Administrator.  He has been asked on numerous occasions to resolve complex policy issues for clients and for Congress and was the recipient of the Distinguished Executive Award from President Obama in 2012.

Chuck was the director of site operations in Japan during the Fukushima nuclear plant accident.  He helped reestablish that country’s regulatory body after the accident and also established criteria to restart nuclear plants that had been shut down in Japan.  Dr. Casto, once again may I say what a privilege it is to have you here on Manage This.

CHARLES CASTO: I’m happy to be here. Thank you, Nick.

NICK WALKER:  Well, last time we met we talked about responding to this international crisis and what it took to lead people through it.  So let’s recap just a little bit.  Can you just briefly describe where were you when you first heard about this accident?

CHUCK CASTO:  Friday, March 11th, like many of us, I saw on television that the nuclear plant and – well, the earthquake had happened, and the tsunami had happened.  And then we had learned somewhere late that afternoon that the nuclear plant had experienced a devastating tsunami attack, 45 feet high at least, and had wiped out their cooling systems.

For me, I was working construction projects for several reactors under construction here in Georgia and South Carolina, not really connected to the operational part of the house any longer, had been with the operational part for decades.  So Washington was handling the crisis.  I was here, remote Atlanta, working a construction project in obscurity when Prime Minister Kan called President Obama and asked for help.  And as they looked for people to lead the team in Japan, my name popped up, and I was chosen.

I guess the first real interaction, I was actually nearby here, getting gas, fueling my pickup truck.  And my neighbor called me and said, “Chuck, what’s up with this nuclear plant in Japan?”  And I said, “Well, John, they’ll get power and water back to it, and everything will be just fine.”  Well, I was quite wrong.  And later on, when he found that I was leading the effort, he said, “You, Mister, everything’s going to be okay.  You’re leading the effort.”  So it was – the outcome was much different than we had expected.

And when I finally got the call, I had three hours’ notice to grab my passport.  I was in downtown Atlanta.  I had to have my wife get some few clothes together and a passport, and drive back north and then back down to the airport, meanwhile on cell phone getting charters and getting calls from the chairman and other people about the role.  I think, as a good crisis leader, I put on a shirt that had a logo, had a nuclear logo on it.

BILL YATES:  Yeah.

CHUCK CASTO:  And I jumped on an American flight.  And as I got on the flight, the flight attendant – of course everything’s going on; right?  Everyone’s talking about this nuclear plant disaster.  And here we are getting on a flight to go to Narita with a crew.  I didn’t really appreciate the fear that was happening with the people on the flight and the flight attendants and the crew about flying to Japan during the midst of this disaster.  And then I walk on the flight with a logo shirt on that says, you know, nuclear guy.

BIIL YATES:  Target.

NICK WALKER:  That’s your first mistake.

CHUCK CASTO:  So I sat down in the back of the aircraft with, you know, back – as a government worker, you sit back there with the cows, the chickens, and the pigs, back in the back; right?  And we get up to cruising altitude, and the steward, head steward came.  And she says, “Mr. Casto.”  And I said, “Yes?”  She said, “Would you get your stuff and come with me?”  Well, I thought they were going to throw me off the airplane, right, at cruising altitude.

BILL YATES:  I’ll take the shirt off.  I’ll take the shirt off.

CHUCK CASTO:  Yeah, right, seriously, I’ll cover it up or something.  And she took me up to first class and put me in an empty seat in first class.  Well, I thought that was great.  I’ll be able to get some sleep and get some rest.  And I had some manuals I’d brought with me, and I’ll think, and I’ll study.  Well, what it really turned out was they wanted to talk with me.  And literally, no exaggeration, for the next eight hours the crew would come up individually and in pairs.  They would think of – they’d ask questions.  Then they’d come back, and they’d say, oh, wait, what we did, we forgot to ask him about this; right?  Let’s go ask him about this.

And basically what they were interested in, are we safe?  Are we safe flying into Japan during this radioactive release?  So that’s when it really struck me.  I mean, you know kind of organically that the people are worried.  But this is real concern when people are sitting with you, and they’re afraid for their health.  They’re afraid for their life.

BILL YATES:  Oh, yeah.  Chuck, you’ve mentioned the 50 who were on…

CHUCK CASTO:  Oh, the Fukushima 50, yes, yeah.

BILL YATES:  Yeah.  And obviously they made a great sacrifice.

CHUCK CASTO:  Absolutely.

BILL YATES:  There was loss of life, even at the facility.

CHUCK CASTO:  There were two operators who drowned in the plant, yes.

BILL YATES:  Yeah.  As you’re stepping into this situation there’s fear; there’s uncertainty; there’s doubt.  Those are ingredients that no project manager wants to face.

CHUCK CASTO:  That’s right.

BILL YATES:  And we hit on this theme before of all these data points that are coming in that you’re having to – you’re having to control that fear, that uncertainty, that doubt; look at these data points and, as you said before, see where they fit in your goalposts of those extremes and are they within that range, that bell curve that you’re trying to define; and resist the temptation, if it’s outside one way or the other, to jump on, you know, the sky is falling until you have, as you mentioned, more friends.

CHUCK CASTO:  That’s right.

BILL YATES:  More data points.

CHUCK CASTO:  More data points.

BILL YATES:  Just talk us through more.  How do you control, when you have passionate engineers who are in a once-in-a-life situation with this much crisis and chaos, how do you control those people and stick to your model, which you know is appropriate for this situation?

CHUCK CASTO:  Well, thanks for that, Bill.  And the difference in this, in leadership in this event, than most crisis events is that many of the leaders involved, not necessarily me, but many of the leaders involved, the Fukushima 50, were facing their own mortality.  So this is a situation – when you’re a leader, you come to work, and you don’t expect to face life-and-death situations.  We have organizations, first responders.  We have the military who, in those domains, they train, and they expect death.  This is a commercial application where you don’t expect to be faced with the situation of your own death or the death of your employees.  So that completely turns the leadership story around and the importance of remaining calm and organized.

I’ll tell one story about Izawa.  He was the control room operator.  When the earthquake hit, they lost power in the plant.  But they’re used to a power loss, and they have trained for that.  That was normal.  There were a lot of alarms, a lot of noise in the control room, a lot of chaos going on; but they were controlling it.  Then all of a sudden the chaos started to stop.  There were no more alarms, no more – and they didn’t realize, because they’re inside this big protected building, that the tsunami had hit.  But suddenly the alarms start going quiet.  The controls start going dark.  You no longer have control of the plant.  You can’t see control of the plant.  And the operators in the control room, this is unusual.  We train for some of this, to some extent.  But this was well beyond what is normal training, what you would consider normal training.

People were panicked.  People were screaming at each other in the control room about where are the control rods, where’s the cooling at, cooling flow.  So Izawa, I thought he did an interesting thing.  The first thing he did when he realized that they had lost control of the plant was he actually stepped behind a beam, and he self-reflected.  He took a second, and he stood there where no one could see him.  And he stood there, and he said, okay, what’s my heart rate doing?  Are my palms wet?  Am I under control?  Do I have control of myself?  Because if I don’t have control of myself, right, we know from Covey who’s the hardest person to manage.  Yourself; right?  So he took a few seconds in the midst of chaos just to make sure he was calm.

BILL YATES:  What an excellent point.

CHUCK CASTO:  Yeah.  And then he could go to his operators and say, now, let’s settle down.  Ultimately, when you think about it, the control room was dark.  They had lost the lighting.  You don’t know what the radiation level is.  You’ve lost your radiation reading.  You don’t know if these are lethal doses that you’re being exposed to.  You have no controls.  There is no reason to stay in that control room.  No reason.  And the operators, young operators went to Izawa and said, “Boss, there is no reason to be here.  The only thing that could happen here is we die from overexposure of radiation.  We’re ready to get out of here.”  But he had to keep them there.

So here is this young leader, Izawa, who has his staff, his team, wishing to evacuate, to leave.  And he had to keep them there, even when there was no reason to stay.  And he did a great job of it.  He did a fantastic job of keeping them in the control room and basically telling them, you know, this is our job.  And the people outside that are being evacuated would expect us to do everything, even when there’s nothing we can do.

BILL YATES:  Wow.

CHUCK CASTO:  And we should stay.  They all had tears in their eyes.  He bowed to them and said, “I need you to stay with me.”  And they stayed.  So that mortality, it’s called “mortality salience” in the literature, or “death anxiety,” is how your decision-making changes.  When you’re faced with your own death, it doesn’t matter what your supervisor says.  You’re going to – your natural instincts are going to take over; right?  And so for a leader to be able to overcome those natural instincts and manage that person and lead that person, that’s incredible.

ANDY CROWE:  I mean, that is leadership.

CHUCK CASTO:  Absolutely.

ANDY CROWE:  And, you know, panic is contagious.  There is no question.  But calm is contagious, too.

BILL YATES:  That’s right.

CHUCK CASTO:  Right.  Well, that’s a very good point.  And he knew that.  He knew, if one of those operators panicked, they would probably all panic, and he would lose them.  So trying to keep any one of them from panicking was important.

BILL YATES:  There’s a quote that comes to mind.  Admiral William McRaven, he served in the U.S. Navy for 37 years.  I just recently saw a speech that he gave in 2014.  He was a SEAL, a Navy SEAL for 36 years.  And one of his quotes was, “If you want to change the world, you must be your very best in the darkest moment.”  And that resonated with me.  You know, as a project manager I don’t think of my darkest moment as being a life or death situation.  But for the leadership that they lived out, that’s commendable.

CHUCK CASTO:  And, you know, of course that’s a military application.  And I know McRaven, and he does a great job.  And I’ve listened to his speeches.  They’re incredible.  We’re never going to make people in a movie theater, leaders in a movie theater, an extreme crisis leader.  But what can we learn?  What can we learn from this to apply to our own workplace?  You’re not going to be Izawa.  That’s not going to happen to you.

BILL YATES:  Right.

CHUCK CASTO:  Let’s hope that never happens to you.

BILL YATES:  God hope.

CHUCK CASTO:  But what can we learn from it?  And I think the biggest, one of the biggest learnings is there’s a threshold of trust.  We in our workplace, we trust each other.  I trust you sitting here, Bill, Andy and Nick.  I trust you as we sit here that you have my best interests in mind.  An active shooter walks in the door, the threshold of trust changes.  Right?  And what you see in these crises like this, an extreme crisis, is that threshold changes; but also there’s a constant reexamination of the leader during the crisis.

So I think that’s one of the things we can learn is that, if we have a remote location or something that’s undergoing some kind of chaos like that, you understand that those leaders are having a huge difficulty in leading right now, and they’re probably not prepared for what they’re about to face.  So your leadership in that organization is probably going to be heavily challenged.  And you have to know that as a CEO.

ANDY CROWE:  Chuck, I want to return to something you brought up last time.  We talked about what success looked like.  And you used a great word picture of goalposts and said, you know, ideally the best worst case, if I’m getting that right, was that things don’t get any worse; and the worst worst case is they get a lot worse.  And but I asked you what success looked like.  You said that no more radioactivity escaped.  So let me ask you this.  You’ve got this mission, and it’s got a lot of visibility, and there is – there are life or death consequences in play here.  How much influence did you have toward creating that outcome or steering toward that outcome?

CHUCK CASTO:  Great, great question because this is one of the most important lessons, I think, in leadership that I learned.  Remember, and for all of your project managers who work in an international atmosphere, this is a whole different culture.  You are being plucked from the American culture.  Now you’re in the Japanese culture.  Completely different.  So our leadership style as Americans – here’s our leadership style as Americans when we go international.  We listen.  We analyze.  And then we boss.  That’s what Americans do when they go international; right?  They just – I know what your answer is.  I’m going to give it to you.  And I’m going to save you all the effort because I know what your answer is.

And you know what?  You know what we did when we got over there?  The same thing.  The first few days we got into this, well, these are American reactors.  They were built by General Electric, an American company.  We’ve operated them for decades.  We’ll tell you exactly what you need to do.  And that didn’t work.  We had a lot of difficulty with that.  We tried to impose some solutions on them that were not workable.

And I actually went into a meeting, and I just listened.  I listened to them explain why it wasn’t workable.  I didn’t – I tried not to bias myself.  I’m just going to listen to what they have to say.  And I’m going to learn.  And I’m going to learn it from their perspective.  I’m going to understand it in their mind, not in my mind, but understand their mind; right?  And then I’m going to look for ways to help them through that – not boss, but help them through that.  And then perhaps I can lead from that.  So I call it “listen, learn, help, and lead” through a solution.  I think that’s the most important thing that I learned in working with another culture.

And learning the cultural ways, it’s important to learn their culture as quickly as you can and to work with that culture.  I have a funny story.  As we would meet, the Japanese have a tendency to organize the room.  The room, the meeting room has to be perfectly organized.  There’s certain structure that has to be done.  Sort of the lowest ranking person has to sit closest to the door in case somebody needs to go get something, and there’s all kinds of strategies for how the room is set up.

When I learned that, it was taking us a long time to get to the meat of the meeting by setting up the room.  So I would tell my people, okay, let’s get there 10 minutes earlier.  We know the way this room has to be set up.  Let’s set up the room, get it all set up; and then they can just walk in, and we can start the meeting.  We don’t have to hesitate with this room.  So use it as a strategic advantage to you and learn their culture and work within their culture.

BILL YATES:  Yeah.  You adapted.

CHUCK CASTO:  You adapt, right.

ANDY CROWE:  I managed a project back right before Y2K, and it involved France, the U.K., the U.S., Spain, Germany, and The Netherlands, so six countries together.  And I was the PM over those six countries.  And just within the five European countries that I was working with, the cultural differences were astonishing.  Just between – even between Germany and Italy and France, the cultural differences were stunning.  And so, you know, and yet those were ones I could at least somewhat relate to.  And you get into this situation, and you find that, hey, there’s a different culture.  There’s a different approach to how you lead and how you have to listen and how you have to influence.  So this is good stuff, Chuck.

CHUCK CASTO:  And we’re not in charge; right?  This is not our country, not our reactors.  So it is about influencing.  That’s what it’s about is how do I influence?

BILL YATES:  One of the things that you mentioned in our first conversation were there were two – your charter really had two pieces to it.  And one of those goals was to protect the 200,000 U.S. citizens that were in Japan.  When we look at it, was that the easier thing to do?  What did that look like?  Did it really come back to that key success factor of we need to limit the radiation release as much as possible?  Were there any other factors you had to think about related to those U.S. citizens?

CHUCK CASTO:  Trying to – many of the embassies in Japan evacuated, and many of the dependents evacuated.  Now, we’re talking about an alliance with the Americans and the Japanese, a strategic alliance that goes way back, and that we are linked in protecting their nation.  So if the Americans run, if the Americans leave, what message does that send to the Japanese?

BILL YATES:  Right.

CHUCK CASTO:  Right?  We have the strategic alliance on the northern coastline.  Obviously, they have some neighbors up there that cause some problems.  So you’ve got the Reagan out there doing her mission, not only to recover and rescue the lost, but to protect the northern alliance.

ANDY CROWE:  That’s the aircraft carrier.

CHUCK CASTO:  The aircraft carrier the Reagan.  And then us trying to keep – we did do a dependent evacuation.  Seven thousand dependents did leave, were authorized early.  It’s called “voluntary early departure.”  And they were allowed to go back to the states.  There were YouTube videos being published by Americans that were very unhelpful.  They were speculation about what was going on.  There was a lot of antinuclear, to be honest with you, a lot of antinuclear people were publishing very bad, very poor, very inaccurate YouTube videos.  And of course the dependents and the workers, the Americans in Japan, see these.  And they think that the American government is not telling the truth, or the Japanese government’s not telling the truth.  And they believe this stuff on the Internet.  It was very harmful to our mission.

ANDY CROWE:  And in great contrast to the way you’re carefully challenging each fact and each fact bringer.

CHUCK CASTO:  That’s right.

ANDY CROWE:  That somebody speculates.  But they probably put it out as if it’s absolute truth.

CHUCK CASTO:  Absolute.  And some of these people were nuclear engineers.  They’re antinuclear people who have turned, and they’re publishing.  So then they take about 1 percent of the facts and weave a 100 percent story out of it, false story.  So that was very – trying to keep people calm, the dependents, the American citizens.

And then we had the military, U.S. military doing their mission there, as well, 50,000 service people.  And then on the Reagan, on the USS Reagan, things came to me that I had no idea, you know, you just don’t have a perspective on.  I remember the military was very concerned about where the Reagan should be positioned and about future plumes of radioactivity coming from the site because you have 15,000 sailors and troops out there with the carrier group, and they were very worried about that.  Obviously, the Reagan had already sailed through a plume of radioactivity and was contaminated – the equipment, the people, all that.  And, by the way, she kept doing her mission despite that, right, the U.S. military.

And things that I hadn’t considered even as a nuclear person, the admirals were saying, look, we have women of childbearing age on the aircraft carrier can be exposed.  We have pregnant women on.  They were lactating and shipping milk back to the mainland from people on – so when you get into a crisis like this, these other aspects come in that you really had no visibility on; right?  You had no visibility.  You had knockoff radiation detectors were pouring into the country from China and other places.  So people were measuring radiation everywhere.

ANDY CROWE:  So Chuck, you’ve got this situation that is a crisis like nothing we had seen, really.  I mean, it dwarfs what happened at Three Mile Island in many ways.

CHUCK CASTO:  Absolutely.

ANDY CROWE:  The evacuation aspect and all of these other components to it.  So as project managers, we always ask a really important question at the end of a project, and that is – it ties back to lessons learned, which is ask the question:  If you had this to do over again, what would you do differently?  So I want to ask you that because you lived through this.  You were there.  I’ve seen many photos of you in a hazmat suit.

CHUCK CASTO:  That’s right.

ANDY CROWE:  You know, a radiation suit.  That would be an interesting way to try to get bumped up to first class.  Maybe I’ll put one of those on next – shouldn’t make light of that.  But the idea now that you can look back at this.  What would you do differently?  What are your lessons learned?

CHUCK CASTO:  Well, the biggest one, as I spoke earlier, I would have connected at the senior management levels sooner, with the utility and with the government.  We tried.  What we all try is let’s get the engineers tied together and get them talking to each other.

BILL YATES:  Right.

CHUCK CASTO:  You have to do that.  But that doesn’t help you with what we call “sensemaking,” making sense of the situation.  Right?  It doesn’t – Karl Weick’s sensemaking, enacted sensemaking and working your way through a problem; not overcommitting to a direction where you think that, well, I’ve got these data points, so that’s the direction, that’s where I’m trying – in a crisis like this, one of the biggest things I think you have to do is to not overcommit and think you know what the situation is when you don’t.  Right?  So I would go in much more eyes wide open and not try to solve the immediate technical problem, but try to protect people on the outside and work my way in, rather than we tried – if this makes any sense.  We tried local solutions inside the reactors to fix it.

But we, as you said, Bill, we didn’t have infrastructure to do it, didn’t have – so we were trying to work from the inside, deep inside the reactor, out to the people and protect them.  I probably would focus more on going the other way, right, is to protect the people, get the evacuation, make sure the evacuation is clean.  People died during the evacuation.

And so that’s something you have to work on.  They chose to move critical care patients, and that caused death.  The law is you can’t use an elevator after an earthquake.  And they tried to move critical care patients down staircases, and that didn’t work in a lot of cases.  So focusing on outside in, more outside in, I think, Andy, would be – I don’t know if that’s a clear answer.

ANDY CROWE:  Yeah.  I think it’s fascinating to me because I’m one of those who would be trying tactical solutions inside the reactor, as well.  Just that’s my nature is I would be trying to solve it from an engineering perspective.  And, you know, miracle occurs here, and try and implement some great solution.  But it was bigger than that.  And it’s easy to look at it and say, well, our immediate problem is radioactive material escaping, yes.  But you know what?  There is a tremendous problem that radiates out all the way from this, literally.

CHUCK CASTO:  Literally and figuratively; right, right.

ANDY CROWE:  And we’ve got to look at it wholistically.

CHUCK CASTO:  And when you look at many kilometers of abandoned cities and towns – and people left immediately.  You know, as I drove through that area – and I told you some of the infrastructure things.  But you’d also see the front door of the house open where people just left and didn’t even shut the door; right?  Or go by a coffee shop and see coffee cups still sitting on the counter.  You know, so all those things are – the people part of it is essential to get that…

ANDY CROWE:  It’s like Chernobyl in that regard.

CHUCK CASTO:  Oh, yes, right, right.  And in this case the levels were low enough, the radiation levels were low enough, they represented an increase in potential for cancers, but not death.  The levels outside the plant were not at a level that would be fatal; right?  Far from it.  So that’s a big difference than Chernobyl.  Chernobyl, since the fuel actually left the plant, right, there were people being exposed to lethal doses, citizens being exposed to lethal doses outside the plant.  In this case it was a plume of radioactivity at the lower level would be an increase in risk of cancer.

BILL YATES:  One of the lessons learned that you brought out was a – it was a straight-up engineering construction type thing related to the backup generators.

CHUCK CASTO:  Right.

BILL YATES:  That just, you know, it was like, my jaw dropped when you mentioned, okay…

ANDY CROWE:  They were in the basement.

BILL YATES:  …the generators were in the basement.

CHUCK CASTO:  Yeah, right.

BILL YATES:  Tsunami, water, basement, flood, no power.  Were there other takeaways like that, that from a perspective that we can relate to as PMs, that you look at and go, okay, this was a nugget that we pulled out of these retrospectives that we did.

CHUCK CASTO:  There were many technical issues inside the plant that had to be redesigned after the accident.  I would say, just to put it simply, after every event – like 9/11 we learned in the nuclear industry, what do we need to do differently?  After 9/11 attacks on a nuclear plant, we decided to have temporary equipment at the site that could be brought in.  If an aircraft attacked the plant and ruined the systems, we’d have temporary equipment there that could be brought in.

What we learned from 3/11 was that you could lose the entire site, and all the backup.  Even if you stored backup equipment onsite, you could lose that.  So what we’ve done in the U.S. and in many countries now is we’ve staged equipment.  There are two locations in the United States, two regional locations in the United States where all the plants have coordinated the logistics of I need this pipe size, flanged here.  I need this.  What might I need if there’s a major accident?

So we store those in two regional centers and make sure they have airlift capability so that, if a reactor does experience a devastating attack of some kind, or accident of some kind, then that could be brought in from the regional centers.  We try to make them self-sufficient for the first 72 hours.  But then the regional help comes in.  So that’s the big change that we have.

NICK WALKER:  Dr. Casto, thanks so much…

CHUCK CASTO:  It’s been a pleasure.

NICK WALKER:  …for sharing your experience with us.

CHUCK CASTO:  Absolute pleasure.

NICK WALKER:  Just a fascinating conversation.

CHUCK CASTO:  Thank you, gentlemen.

NICK WALKER:  We have a special gift for you.

CHUCK CASTO:  Oh, wow, a gift and everything, wow.

NICK WALKER:  Yeah, it’s this Manage This coffee mug.

CHUCK CASTO:  Okay, great.

NICK WALKER:  This is our version of the logo shirts.

CHUCK CASTO:  Okay.

ANDY CROWE:  And it will get you bumped up easily.

CHUCK CASTO:  It will definitely get you to business class, and I…

ANDY CROWE:  Or at least comfort.

CHUCK CASTO:  Comfort, yeah, discomfort class.  Thank you, gentlemen.

NICK WALKER:  Well, thanks again, Chuck.  Andy and Bill, thanks for your insight, as well.

We want to remind our listeners that free PDUs, Professional Development Units, are almost in your pocket.  And they’re yours for just listening to this podcast.  To claim them, go to Velociteach.com and select Manage This Podcast from the top of the page.  Click the button that says Claim PDUs and just click through the steps.

That’s it for us here on Manage This.  We hope you’ll tune back in on September 19th for our next podcast.  In the meantime, you can always visit us at Velociteach.com/managethis to subscribe to this podcast, to see a transcript of the show, or to contact us.  And tweet us at @manage_this if you have any questions about our podcasts or about project management certifications.  We love to hear from you.

That’s all for this episode.  Thanks for joining us.  Until next time, keep calm and Manage This.